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Effects of US Monetary Policy on Gross Capital Flows: 
Cases in Korea† 
By WOO JIN CHOI* 
U.S. monetary policy has been claimed to generate global spillover and 
to destabilize other small open economies. We analyze the effects of 
certain identified U.S. monetary shocks on gross capital flows in the 
Korean economy using the local projection method. Consistent with 
previous results on other small open economies, we initially confirm 
that U.S. interest rate hikes are dynamically correlated with foreign 
outflows and residents’ inflows. That is, not only are they correlated with 
withdrawals by foreigners but they are also correlated with those by 
domestic (Korean) investors. The results are mostly driven by portfolio 
flows. Second, however, the marginal response to a U.S. monetary 
policy shock is, on average, subdued if we focus on the sample periods 
after the Global financial crisis of 2007-2008 (henceforth, global 
financial crisis). We conjecture a possible reason behind the change, an 
institutional change related to financial friction. If the degree of 
pledgeability of the value of net worth increases, the marginal responses 
by both investors would drop with a U.S. monetary policy shock, 
consistent with our findings. 
Key Word: U.S. Monetary Policy Spillovers, Gross Capital Flows, 
Local Projections, Financial Frictions 
JEL Code: F32, F41, F42, E5 
 
 
  I. Introduction 
 
he foreign effects of U.S. monetary policy has been among the most important 
topics in the open macroeconomics literature over the past decade. In a small open 
economy, volatile capital flows caused by external shocks play a central role in 
destabilizing macroeconomics. Consequently, they have been major concerns. not only 
by scholars but also by policymakers. Especially during the period of time referred to
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here as the ‘great financial crisis’, the destabilizing effects of U.S. monetary policy 
shocks and the concurrent risk aversion and liquidity spillover to other economies 
have been widely debated. What has been termed the global financial cycle and 
subsequent investor sentiments are claimed to fluctuate with U.S. monetary policy.1 
To understand how a U.S. monetary policy shock can spillover to other small open 
economies is clearly crucial to understand not only the determinants of capital flows 
but also to the overall macroeconomics dynamics. 
In this article, we analyze the effects of a US monetary policy shock on Korean 
gross capital flows. A vast amount of literature covers new stylized facts regarding 
the determinants of gross capital flows in emerging or small economies. However, 
although Korea has been one of the most open economies in terms of both the trade 
and financial sectors, we do not have a sufficient understanding of the effects of U.S. 
monetary policy on capital flows in Korea. Accordingly, there remains no consensus 
on the topic. The East Asian crisis is the textbook balance of payment crisis with a 
bank runs on emerging economies. Moreover, the global financial crisis hit the 
Korean economy relatively hard. While the importance of the external sectors and 
capital flows has never been underestimated in determining fiscal and monetary 
policy, the effects of U.S. monetary policy on gross capital flows has been missing 
from the debate. Also, while it has been claimed that the capital flows of the Korean 
economy are more resilient to external shocks after the global financial crisis, not 
many attempts have been made to assess the merits of such a statement systemically. 
Using the local projection method on gross capital flows and with an identified 
U.S. monetary policy shock, we fill this gap. In a nutshell, we confirm that the 
patterns in Korea are consistent with those in other small open economies. We first 
identify US monetary policy shocks on a quarterly basis, as in Iacoviello and Navarro 
(2019). We then find, before the global financial crisis, that U.S. monetary policy 
hikes, tightening shocks on the U.S. federal funds rate, are correlated, not only with 
capital outflows by foreign investors but also with capital inflows by Korean 
residents who hold the asset position externally.2 In the baseline specification before 
the crisis, we confirm that if U.S. monetary policy increases by one hundred basis 
points, foreign investors pull their positions out of Korea, with the foreign liability 
position decreased by 13.8 percent. At the same time, domestic investors retrench 
their positions and inflow capital, and the external asset position is decreased by 4.8 
percent. Thus, a U.S. monetary policy shock is associated with decreases in gross 
capital flows. However, overall, the degree of inflows by residents is smaller than 
the level of outflows by foreigners, and net capital flows mark deficits (net outflows) 
with a U.S. monetary policy shock. Upon a local projection analysis of gross capital 
flows, we distinguish FDI, portfolio and other flows of both foreigners and local 
residents. We note that the overall flows are mostly driven by portfolio flows. Unlike 
earlier works which stress the role of banking flows, we could not find meaningful 
results with regard to other flows, i.e., mainly banking flows.3 
 
1Furthermore, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020) also claim that it is not feasible to cope with those by means 
of conventional monetary policy or exchange rate policies. 
2 For further discussions on gross capital flows and the related terminology (surges, flights, stops, and 
retrenchments) please see Forbes and Warnock (2012). 
3We note that these results are even different from the results of the companion article, Choi (2020). In the 
previous article, preceding the current article, most of the stand-out results are for other (banking) flows. We will 
discuss this difference later in sections IV and V. 
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Second, we provide a consistent result that supports the prior contention that the 
effects are smaller after the global financial crisis. If we focus on the sample periods 
after the crisis, the overall patterns of the capital flows are broadly consistent; both 
foreign and domestic investors withdraw their external positions upon the shock. 
However, marginal response to a U.S. monetary policy shock is much smaller than 
it was earlier. If U.S. monetary policy increases by one hundred basis points, on 
average, foreign investors decrease their positions in Korea by 4.8 percent, while 
domestic investors decrease their foreign positions by 2.9 percent. Although the 
evidence does not provide any statistical inference, the magnitudes are on average 
smaller than the average responses in the periods before the crisis.4 
Our results contribute to the ongoing debate in several ways. First, we confirm 
that (in our base line specification) gross capital also matters in Korea, as in other 
small economies. As international capital claims are much more bilateral than ever 
before, the importance of gross capital flows has been stressed by many scholars. 
Unlike previous wisdom, international investors have cross-hold claims on each 
other much more than before. Consequently, Broner et al. (2013) claim that domestic 
investors play a much greater role as financial integration evolves and generates very 
different dynamics compared to a situation in which net flows are mostly driven by 
international investors. Thus, when not taking gross positions into account, we may 
miss important dynamics of capital flows. Along with the identified U.S. monetary 
policy which disentangles only the unexpected component of rate changes of U.S. 
federal funds, to understand the behavior of residents is critical. Retrenchments of 
capital imply that they do not simply react to simple interest rate differentials 
between the U.S. and a small open economy. The literature, which only focused on 
interest rate differentials on net capital flows, would predict net outflows of small 
open economies. However, this would not be able to account for capital inflows by 
residents.  
We also note that our results are consistent with the claim that the Korean economy 
is less vulnerable to external shocks. Many scholars, policymakers, and participants 
in capital markets argue that capital flows in Korea have become apparently more 
resilient to external shocks after the global financial crisis. Although the 'taper 
tantrum' of 2013 hit many emerging economies and drove abrupt capital outflows, 
the country did not engage in the typical response of an emerging economy. Capital 
indeed flowed into Korea, while other emerging economies such as Turkey suffered 
significant outflows during the event. Moreover, despite the heightened volatility in 
global financial markets in 2018, Korea had strong capital inflows. Based on these 
outcomes, IMF Article IV in 2019 stated that  
 
“[...]the episode was suggestive of occasional safe-haven patterns in the demand 
for Korean debt securities[...]”.  
 
Although the possibility has repeatedly been raised by many people, no attempts 
have been made to compare the elasticity of capital flows. Our paper also does not 
provide any rigorous statistical inferences, but we do see that the marginal responses 
 
4It should be noted that we do not provide statistical test results that confirm the differences. One cannot directly 
map and compare the confidence intervals of the two different samples. Thus, we posit no statistical inferences. 
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to a U.S. monetary policy shock are on average quite different. We claim that these 
outcomes support the prior belief that the responsiveness of capital outflows is much 
lower.  
We apply the local projection method to estimate the impulse response of 
identified U.S. monetary policies on gross capital flows. After being introduced by 
Jordà (2005), the local projection approach quickly became the standard 
methodology to analyze impulse response outcomes. Instead of specifying a system 
of equations when calculating the impulse response to a shock, the local projection 
method projects the impact of a shock on the response variable locally; by extending 
the period between the moment a shock is applied and the response variable reacts, 
the local projection method directly estimates the dynamic impulse response of the 
variable of interest. Because we are interested in the disaggregate component of 
capital flows along with the overall flow, it is more appropriate to apply the local 
projection method to each flow independently than to use the VAR. In addition, 
because we previously identified a U.S. monetary policy shock based on Iacoviello 
and Navarro (2019), we do not need to hinge on further identification. Thus, local 
projection will serve as a simple but powerful econometric methodology. 
Various interpretations are possible with regard to the results of empirical analyses 
indicating that the impact of a U.S. interest rate shock on Korea's capital flows has 
decreased since the global financial crisis. The Korean economy has been through 
numerous transitions since the crisis. Possibly, monetary policies and/or exchange 
rate policies have changed and play a role, especially after the crisis. Moreover, 
capital controls or macro-prudential policies have been implemented. Among others, 
we supplement our main empirical results with a possible answer that hinges on an 
institutional improvement in financial friction. It is now widely believed that 
financial friction in international capital transactions plays a very important role in 
shock propagation, monetary spillover and the resulting volatile capital flows. 
Especially in emerging economies, binding financial constraints against international 
capital inflows are crucial to understand external vulnerabilities, especially 
combined with dollar-denominated debt. Through the lens of the two-country new 
Keynesian model with financial friction, we claim that the improved pledgeability 
of net worth can serve a possible answer to the smaller responses of both domestic 
and foreign investors. That is, if financial friction in capital market is lower than 
before, the responsiveness of domestic and foreign reallocations of assets with 
external shocks could now be lower. If the fraction that can be borrowed against the 
net worth increases due to the increased credibility, the inefficiency during financial 
intermediation will decrease. Using the mid-scale new Keynesian model in Banerjee, 
Devereux, and Lombardo (2016), we argue that this hypothesis can qualitatively 




Capital flows are the vehicle that enables financial and trade transactions and are 
the basis for open macroeconomics. Many studies have focused on the determinants 
of the net capital flows. However, research on gross capital flows, which 
distinguishes domestic from foreign investors, has received much attention since the 
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global financial crisis. In a small open economy, especially in an emerging country, 
an economic crisis often appears as an external crisis; the crisis comes as a tale of 
foreign capital inflows and subsequent sudden reversals. Accordingly, the emerging 
country's external crisis is referred to as a sudden capital outflow, or a 'sudden stop'. 
Researchers have then found that not only foreigners but also domestic investors are 
actively involved in capital withdraws during contractions. More specifically, while 
foreigners' inflows turn into abrupt capital stops, at the same time, domestic investors 
also retrench and pull their external position out actively. This has become a new 
stylized fact widely believed by many scholars. As the capital inflows and outflows 
occur at the same time but as the outflows by foreigners usually outweigh the 
magnitude of inflows by domestic residents, the total net assets are negative 
(deficits). In this article, we confirm that if there is a shock in the form of an interest 
rate hike in the United States, foreigners' withdrawals (outflows) and domestic 
investors' withdrawal (inflows) occur simultaneously in Korea. In particular, these 
patterns of inflow and outflow have been observed primarily in portfolio flows. On 
the other hand, regarding FDI and other flows, these patterns are relatively weak.  
There have been several important studies of the determinants of gross capital 
flows. Forbes and Warnock (2012) discussed four types of sudden/extreme capital 
flows: foreign capital inflows (surges), foreign capital outflows (stops), domestic 
residents' capital outflows (flights), and domestic residents' capital inflows 
(retrenchments). The factors that determine each type of capital inflow were 
explained more by push factors than by pull factors. Specifically, by analyzing 
quarterly data of 50 countries from 1980 to 2009, it is claimed that the degree of the 
global risk factor represented by the VIX was the most important factor affecting 
these rapid flows. On the other hand, Broner et al. (2013) emphasized the importance 
of gross flows along with the procyclicality of the business cycle. Fratzscher (2012) 
analyzed the determinants of capital outflows using micro data (securities) and 
argued that capital outflows are determined by external factors such as global 
liquidity and risk preferences, similar to other studies. 
Regarding the capital flows of Korea, Choi (2018) argued that an increase in the 
Federal Funds rate significantly reduces foreign capital, but not by a large magnitude. 
Yu (2018) argue that arbitration factors such as policy interest rate differentials 
between Korea and the U.S., are important during the pre-crisis period, and risk 
preferences are more important during the post-crisis period. However, these studies 
deal only with the behavior of foreigners and do not cover domestic investors, nor 
incorporate identified shocks. Ours will instead focus on the capital flows of both 
domestic and foreign investors while using identified U.S. monetary policy shocks. 
We also focus on how these effects change before and after the global financial crisis. 
Close to our study, Yun and Park (2019) reviewed both types of capital flows, as 
in this paper. They analyzed the impact of policy interest rate differentials between 
Korea and the U.S. using an autoregressive variance model (ARDL) and the local 
projection method. They claim that Korea's capital outflow is not systematically 
related to interest rate differentials prior to the global financial crisis but that it is 
correlated with residents’ other investments and foreign portfolio investments. This 
has a somewhat different implication from our outcome here. First, we focus on 
identified interest rate hikes of the U.S. rather than on the simple interest rate 
difference between Korea and the U.S. Second, we focus on the impact on short-
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term fluctuations of capital flows, as we include the time trend as a control variable. 
Identifying how capital inflows react to simple interest rates may be the first step. 
However, using the interest rate differential assumes that the elasticity of each 
country's policy interest rates on capital inflows is identical. That is, they focus on 
the effects of the variable with the linear and forceful combination of the two interest 
rates and determine how it is related to capital flows. These may not be linked to our 
interest or may not be relevant if we assume that the marginal elasticity levels of the 
interest rate increases in Korea and the U.S. are not alike. Moreover, the simple 
interest differential is also associated with the endogeneity issue, as the impact of 
interest rate change expectations on capital outflows could not be controlled. Finally, 
if we focus on the marginal responses of capital flows with a relatively short-term 
horizon, the time trend must be included.  
To identify a U.S. monetary policy shock, we replicate and update the 
methodology of Iacoviello and Navarro (2019). After controlling the information 
given by observable economic variables at the time of the FOMC meeting, we have 
the portion of the interest rate changes that are not expected by market participants. 
These will be the series of our U.S. monetary policy shocks. There have been several 
other attempts, and other identification methods. Most notably, Romer and Romer 
(2004) collect narrative data available on the day of the FOMC meeting and measure 
the deviation from the projection based on the narrative data. Gertler and Karadi 
(2015) use a high-frequency identification method that incorporates the future values 
of Federal Funds rate. They observe 30-minute-window change of the future of the 
Federal Funds rate before and after a FOMC meeting. Any changes after the 
announcement would capture the surprise experienced by market participants and 
thus would serve as the identified monetary policy shock. However, Romer and 
Romer (2004) could not estimate the interest rate shock during zero interest rate 
periods, and we are not able to obtain up-to-date high-frequency data pertaining to 
Federal Funds futures. Instead, Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) provide an intuitive 
but simple method by which to replicate and extend the series.5 
Whether to control the time trend when estimating the impulse responses of capital 
flows is also important. As can be seen in Yun and Park (2019) and Yun (2018), 
interest rate differentials and capital outflows have been on the rise since 2012. There 
is no consensus among researchers as to whether this trend indicates a causal 
relationship. Yun and Park (2019) claim this trend to be important and possibly 
causal. However, it may also be that the trend shows the long-term trend of financial 
globalization. Our empirical results present a different perspective on the behavior 
of capital flows, with different policy implications. 
When studying the determinants and behaviors of capital flows, some researchers 
emphasize the importance of global risk factors, particularly the VIX, an indicator 
of the volatility expectations of the U.S. stock market that is indicated in the Chicago 
futures options market. Kang, Kim, Suh, and Kang (2018) also emphasize that the 
global factor represented by the VIX is one of the most important causes of capital 
 
5In Iacoviello and Navarro (2019), the authors examine the impact of U.S. interest rate shocks on GDP in 
developed and emerging economies. Utilizing a panel local projection approach with a vulnerability index, they 
conclude that U.S. interest rate shocks are negatively transmitted to neighboring countries but that the degree of 
spillover depends on a certain vulnerability index, such as the exchange rate system, degree of trade openness, or 
other instability indicators. 
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inflows in emerging countries. However, as argued in Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 
(2020), the VIX could be an endogenous variable that reacts to U.S. monetary policy 
and that two variables are thus closely correlated. We assess specifications with or 
without the VIX as a control, though the results were found not to vary much. Bruno 
and Shin (2015) also argued that the tightening monetary policy of the U.S. led to a 
decrease in capital outflows through banks' risk-preferred channels.  
The following studies explore how U.S. monetary policy is transmitted internationally. 
Dedola, Rivolta, and Stracca (2017) use Romer and Romer (2004) to identify 
monetary policy shocks in the United States and then to assess the impact of these 
shocks on macro and financial variables in a sample of 36 countries. After analyzing 
the impact of U.S. interest rate shocks on individual countries through the Bayesian 
structural VAR approach, each country's impulse response is estimated, after which 
the weighted average response of all countries is estimated. The analysis shows that 
the impact of an interest rate hike in the United States has a negative impact on 
individual countries' production and employment levels. Albrizio, Choi, Furceri, and 
Yoon (2019) empirically examined the impact of U.S. interest rate shocks on bank 
flows and claim that U.S. interest rates led to a decrease in bank capital outflows. 
Unlike other studies, Banerjee, Devereux, and Lombardo (2016) present how the 
monetary policies of the core and periphery should be coordinated under external 
shocks in a two-country New Keynesian model with financial friction. The authors 
show that the shock spillover is weaker under the optimal monetary policy if the both 
core and peripheral countries collaborate as compared to that under a Taylor rule 
type of monetary policy. Along with a theoretical model, Banerjee, Devereux, and 
Lombardo (2016) provide an empirical analysis of gross capital flows. We use a 
version of the model presented in Banerjee, Devereux, and Lombardo (2016). We 
change the parameter values of the model, which governs the fraction of the net 
worth that can be funded, to determine how the impulse response pattern changes.6  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In chapter 3, we construct the 
series of identified U.S. monetary policies, the data, and then present the empirical 
specifications. Chapter 4 provides our main empirical results, which constitute the 
main contributions of the paper. We discuss the results and outcomes in light of 
earlier findings. Lastly, in chapter 5, we seek a possible cause of the change of the 
elasticity before and after the crisis. We use the framework of Banerjee, Devereux, 
and Lombardo (2016) and assess how much the improvement in the degree of 
financial friction can explain our empirical results. Chapter 6 concludes the paper. 
 
III. Data and the Econometric Methodology 
 
A. U.S. Monetary Policy Shock 
 
This section presents the methodology of Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) to 
identify a U.S. monetary policy shock. The United States is the most important 
capital exporter and thus the global financial center. In particular, considering the 
 
6We note that Devereux, Engel and Lombardo (2020) also use a version of the model in Banerjee, Devereux, 
and Lombardo (2016) to derive an implementable monetary policy. 
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impact on Korea, interest rate shocks derived from U.S. monetary policy will be one 
of the most important external factors affecting Korea. Accordingly, this analysis 
attempts to estimate the impact of U.S. interest rate hikes. 
Various factors affect the monetary policy stance of the U.S. Directly 
incorporating the Federal Funds rate would bias our estimation, as the expected 
interest rate change can affect capital flows even before the actual changes. 
Therefore, it is necessary to control the information held by market participants at 
the time of the monetary policy. When the interest rate changes in the market, 
economic actors will act proactively, and this tendency becomes more pronounced 
in capital flows. For example, at the time the United States ended the zero-interest 
era and normalized her monetary policy, the actual rate hike took place in 2016, but 
because such normalization had been widely predicted before this event, U.S. 
Treasury bond yields began to rise starting at the end of 2015. Thus, subsequent 
capital reversals took place around the end of 2015. The actual increase in the interest 
rate due to the increase or decrease in the interest rate will be correlated with capital 
outflows before the actual increases in December of 2016. Several existing methods 
can be used to identify U.S. interest rate shocks, but this paper uses the relatively 
simple form of identification used by Iacoviello and Navarro (2019). 7  It is 
straightforward, but we believe that it is very intuitive at the same time and that it is 
rigorous enough to identify monetary policy shocks. The following regression 
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Here, 
t
r   is the U.S. Federal Funds rate, 
t
Z   denotes the control variables 
including current inflation rate and the log of the real GDP and corporate spreads in 
the U.S. We also include lagged values of the U.S. Federal Funds rate, the time trend 
and squared terms of the time trend. We use lagged variables of the last four quarters. 
Our series stretches from the third quarter of 1987, when Alan Greenspan was 
appointed as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, to the most recent first quarter 
of 2019. It should be noted that in our main regression, our sample starts in 1995 due 
to data availability pertaining to the international investment positions of Korea. The 
shadow rate of Wu and Xia (2016) replaces the Federal Funds rate in the era of zero 
interest rates. 
Figure 1 shows the U.S. monetary policy shocks identified through the regression 
equation. We find that the Federal Funds rate and the identified shocks can vary 
substantially depending on the period. In particular, starting in 2002, there is a stark 
difference between the two series.8 Ultimately, the series replicate and update the 
U.S. monetary policy shock of Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) up to the first quarter 
of 2019. 
 
7Iacoviello and Navarro (2019) provide a simple but intuitive methodology with which to identify monetary 
policy shocks. We also have attempted high-frequency identification using Federal Funds futures. However, the 
necessary data is only available for very recent periods. 
8A shock in the form of a significant spike in the US interest rate is observed in the first quarter of 2009, while 
this is not seen in changes in simple interest rates. We note that in our baseline regression, we exclude the sample 
period of 2009, which contains extreme U.S. interest rate shock increases. This does not alter our main results.  
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FIGURE 1. IDENTIFIED U.S. MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS 
Note: The solid line represents identified U.S. monetary policy shocks, and dashed line indicates changes in the 
Federal Funds rate. We identify U.S. monetary policy shocks by projecting the Federal Funds rate onto the 
information set of current and lagged macroeconomic variables, as in Iacoviello and Navarro (2019). 
 
B. Data and the Econometric Methodology 
 
The local projection method, initially proposed by Jordà (2005), has been used in 
various impulse-response analyses. The method does not require the specification of 
the structural relationships between variables in a dynamic system. Thus, it is known 
to have more flexibility and greater versatility than other methods that estimate 
systems of autoregressive variables, i.e., VARs. Accordingly, it has been very 
popular in recent years and has been applied especially when incorporating state 
dependencies. While it is popular due to its versatility, it also has shortcomings in 
that the number of samples decreases rapidly as the spanning of the impulse response 
increases. Thus, it can drop observations in a relatively short spanned sample. 
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where 
t
y  is the log stock of assets or liabilities, 
t
MS  is the identified U.S. 
monetary policy shock as described in the previous section, and 
t
W  denotes the 
added control variables. The capital stock 
t
y  distinguishes foreign liabilities from 
residents’ assets and is further categorized into direct investments (FDI), portfolio 
investments, and other investments, as in financial accounts in the balance of 
payment process.  
We note that the specification and selection of controls proceed similarly to 
Banerjee, Devereux, and Lombardo (2016). Control variables include current and lagged 
(up to two quarters) values of the real GDP growth rate, nominal exchange rate 
appreciation, real GDP growth rates of major trading partners, interest rate changes 
of one-year monetary stabilizing bonds, and percentage increase of foreign exchange 
reserves. The real GDP growth would capture the capital flows generated by 
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additional production. Additionally, the domestic interest rate and nominal exchange 
rate fluctuation would capture exogenous variations in the yield may affect capital 
flows. The time trend and the dummy for the crisis periods are included as further 
controls.9 We presume that capital inflows by one type do not have any structural 
correlation with another. In other words, the regression equation of a certain type of 
capital flow does not have other types of capital flows as control variables. 
In the above regression equation, 
h  is the elasticity of the h-period-ahead 
capital adjustment to a U.S. monetary policy shock. In a standard VAR, historical 
evolution and the consequent inference can be made by estimating a system of 
autoregressive variables. However, when doing so, the estimated coefficients of the 
model are not easily understood nor useful if one is interested in impulse and 
response factors. Instead, in local projections, the effect of the independent variable 
on the dependent variable is estimated by locally projecting the former onto the latter. 
It does not require specification of the true multivariate dynamic system. Thus, 
h  
in our regression equation would convey a more intuitive interpretation of the system 
in terms of the impulse response coefficients. Indeed, Plagborg-Møller and Wolf 
(2020) argue that VARs and local projections will ultimately provide the same 
estimate if the data-generating functions are identical. That is, VAR ( ) and local 
projection would give an identical coefficient and confidence interval asymptotically. 
In Figure 2, we plot the evolution of logged external assets and liabilities. Again, 
the international investment position data is only available after 1995, and our data 
extends from 1995q1 to 2019q3. We also note that mid-90s is the period of the 
beginning of financial liberalization. Starting in 1989, restrictions on external capital 
accounts slowly began to be released. Thus, it will be more appropriate to cut the 
periods before 1995 and focus only on the periods afterwards. 
The upper left part of Figure 2 shows that external assets and liabilities increased 
quite dramatically before the global financial crisis. However, the pace of the growth 
slowed somewhat after the crisis for the foreign liabilities. Instead, external assets 
held by residents grow more rapidly. External assets swelled more compared to 
external liabilities by 2014q3, and Korea became a net external creditor after that 
point. From the figure, we can observe the importance of gross capital flows. It is 
increasingly important to understand the determinants of both the behaviors of 
residents and of international investors. 
We can also confirm that both the FDI and other assets catch up with the external 
liability amount. FDI assets surpass this amount even before the global financial 
crisis. While the magnitude of portfolio assets is slightly smaller than that of the 
liabilities, the discrepancy between two is also narrowed dramatically. Again, in the 




  captures the difference 
between the h-period-ahead values of the log assets or liabilities and the values at 
1t   . Additionally, the local projection method estimates the average dynamic 
responsiveness of the monetary policy on those distanced variables. The estimated 
coefficients can be interpreted as the monetary policy responses of external assets or 
liabilities. 
 
9The crisis dummy is one for 2008q1-2009q2 and 1997q4-1998q1. Here, we split the sample before and after 
the crisis, dropping the period of 2009 from our entire analysis in our baseline specification.  
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FIGURE 2. EXTERNAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF KOREA 
Note: The solid line indicates the log of external asset holdings by residents. The dashed line represents the log of 
the foreign liabilities of foreign investors. 
 
Thus far, we have examined the stock of external assets and liabilities. In Figure 3, 
we instead plot the first differenced values of the log external assets and liabilities. 
Thus, these percentage changes of the stock of assets or liabilities map into capital 
flows of different types of assets or liabilities. We note the following: first, the capital 
flows of residents and international investors are highly correlated. The similarities 




FIGURE 3. CAPITAL FLOWS (CHANGES OF EXTERNAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES) OF KOREA 
Note: The solid line indicates the log differences of external asset holdings by residents. The dashed line denotes the 
log differences of the foreign liabilities of foreign investors. 
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Second, the volatility of portfolio flows is greatest, while the volatility levels of FDI 
and other flows are less significant. Third, the overall volatility of capital flows is 
slightly subdued after the global financial crisis, but not by much. From the first two 
arguments, we can expect the impulse response of flows by residents and 
international investors to be alike, as in other studies of small open economies. In 
next section, we show that the impulse responses of total gross capital flows are 
mostly driven by portfolio flows. It is also important to note that the overall volatility 
does not decrease notably after the global financial crisis. Thus, any significant 
change in the elasticity of a U.S. monetary policy shock will be surprising. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
A. Main Results 
 
In this chapter we present our main empirical results. We split our sample periods 
into two sub-samples and run an impulse response analysis independently for each 
bin. We split our samples for the following reasons. With a U.S. monetary policy 
shock, we want to observe the gross withdrawals of capital flows in Korea, which 
are observed in many other countries. That is, we examine whether there are inflows 
by residents and outflows by foreigners along with a U.S. monetary policy shock. 
We report the results after running a regression on the entire sample in Appendix A. 
However, we could not recover the withdrawals of capital reported in other studies 
for the entire sample.  
At the same time, we examine a possible structural break in the data-generating 
processes in different time periods. The inclusion of the great financial crisis periods 
could also deteriorate the overall results due to extreme capital flows or monetary 
policy shocks during these periods.10 Thus, in our baseline regression, we split our 
sample and presume that each sample period follows different data-generating 
processes and impulse responses.  
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for domestic 
residents’ capital flows before the global financial crisis. As in Albrizio et al. (2019), 
we report 68 percent and 90 percent confidence bands; the dark band denotes the 68 
percent band and the light band is the 90 percent error band.  
At the moment of a 100-basis-point U.S. monetary policy shock, the total amount 
of external assets by residents dropped by around 1.7 percent (of its previous stock). 
On average, there are small capital withdrawals by residents. The inflows last for 
two quarters, reaching 4.8 percent, and slowly return to the initial level afterwards. 
The magnitudes of capital inflows by residents are not statistically significant at the 
90% confidence interval at the peak. Again, we will compare our results with foreign 
investors' impulse responses to determine whether the magnitude is larger in the 
responses of the stops, as in other countries. 
The results vary if we focus more closely on the different types of capital flow by 
residents. Portfolio flows are most responsive to U.S. monetary policy shocks. When 
 
 
10We note that in the companion paper of Choi (2020), the baseline regression includes the entire sample.  
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Total Assets FDI Assets 
 
Portfolio Assets Other Assets 
 
FIGURE 4. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR  
ASSETS BEFORE THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
sample ranges from 1995q1 to 2008q4. Light grey denotes the 90 percent confidence interval, while dark grey is the 
68 percent confidence interval. 
 
hit by a 100-basis-point shock, there are withdrawals by residents. Portfolio 
investments drop by 12.7 percent at that moment and further by 22.1 percent during 
the subsequent first quarter. Portfolio inflows are reversed in the second quarter and 
slowly rebound. For other flows, including banking flows, there are also capital 
inflows by residents. The magnitude amounts to 5.4 percent the third quarter after 
the shock. FDI flows also witness inflows of residents, but in a greatly delayed 
pattern. In summary, capital flows by residents are most notable in portfolio flows. 
While the magnitude and statistical significance are not very strong in the flows 
overall, those of the portfolio flows stand out noticeably.  
Next we move on to the impulse responses of foreign investors. Figure 5 shows 
the results of the impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock on capital flows 
by foreign investors before the global financial crisis. When hit by a 100-basis-point 
increase in U.S. monetary policy, foreign investors pull out their capital by around 
6.0 percent (relative to its previous level). The capital outflows or withdrawals by 
foreign investors continue for up to two more quarters, and the magnitude amounts 
to 13.8 percent. The overall impulse is greater compared to the average withdrawal 
amount by domestic residents. Thus, we will observe net capital outflows on average 
when hit by an external U.S. monetary policy shock. The results are consistent with 
the standard narratives pertaining to average emerging economies.  
Again, when further distinguishing between the types of flows, we find that the 
response is strongest for portfolio flows. The bottom left part of Figure 5 shows that 
with a one-hundred-basis-point increase in the U.S. monetary policy, portfolio 
outflows by foreign investors would reach 13.4 percent. The outflows amount to 28.9 
percent after two quarters, after which they reverse. The response by the FDI flows 
also marks its lowest point during the second quarter, while the magnitude is not as 
strong compared to the portfolio flows. However, the responses of other flows, which  
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Total Liabilities FDI Liabilities 
 
Portfolio Liabilities Other Liabilities 
 
FIGURE 5. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS ON  
LIABILITIES BEFORE THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for logged liabilities, i.e., the claims 
of foreign investors. The sample ranges from 1995q1 to 2008q4. Light grey indicates the 90 percent confidence 
interval, while dark grey shows the 68 percent confidence interval. 
 
include banking flows, are not very notable.11  
Next, we move on to the after-the-crisis subsample periods. As explained 
previously, many people argue that capital flows in Korea became more resilient. In 
Figure 6, we report the impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock for 
residents’ assets. Again, there are contractions in total assets, and the pattern is driven 
by portfolio flows. In upper left part of the figure, we can observe that with a one-
hundred-basis-point increase in the U.S. monetary policy, total assets would drop by 
1.9 percent. The magnitude reaches 2.9 percent during the subsequent third quarter. 
While the inflows are similar at the moment of the shock, subsequent flows are 
much smaller than they were before. In portfolio flows, the inflows amount to 9.9 
percent during the third quarter after the shock. We note that the scale on the y axis 
is much large for portfolio flows than for any of the other flows. We claim that the 
overall pattern is again driven by portfolio flows, but at a much lower magnitude 
than in the before-the-crisis period. 
Moving forward to the foreign investor’s side in Figure 7, we also do not see any 
significant contractions in the total claims with those beforehand. At the moment of 
a 100-basis-point U.S. monetary policy shock, overall claims by foreign investors 
decrease by 4.4 percent. They drop further by as much as 4.8 percent and then 
rebound afterward. However, this outcome is not statistically significant at the 90 
percent confidence level. In agreement with all other analyses, portfolio flows are 
the main drivers of the overall flows by foreign investors. However, the magnitude 
 
11On average, banking flows are said to have the most responsive results when hit by an external shock. Albrizio 
et al. (2019), which covers banking flows, reports around a 12 percent decrease in the second quarter. Also, Choi 
(2020) reports the most responsive results in banking flows. Unlike those studies, in our baseline specification, we 
did not observe any significant results in other flows.  
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FIGURE 6. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR  
ASSETS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
sample ranges from 2010q1 to 2019q2. Light grey shows the 90 percent confidence interval, while dark grey shows 
the 68 percent confidence interval. 
 
Total Liabilities FDI Liabilities 
 
Portfolio Liabilities Other Liabilities 
 
FIGURE 7. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS ON  
LIABILITIES AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for logged liabilities, i.e., the claims 
of foreign investors. The sample ranges from 2010q1 to 2019q2. Light grey indicates the 90 percent confidence 
interval, while dark grey shows the 68 percent confidence interval. 
 
of withdrawal at the moment of the U.S. monetary policy shock is 5.6 percent, and 
then 5.7 percent in the following quarter. Compared to 13.4 percent and 19.9 percent, 
the magnitudes are much smaller. For FDI and other flows by foreign investors, there 
are not statistically significant responses at the moment of a U.S. monetary policy 
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shock. Other flows show slight increases after six quarters, but again the results are 
not statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
At this stage, let us compare the impulse responses of the two different sample 
periods together. In Figures 8 and 9, we combine all of the figures presented earlier. 
We note that the dashed line here indicates the results for the before-the-crisis 
sample, while the solid blue line represents the after-the-crisis sample. In Figure 8, 
we find that retrenchments in assets are notable, especially with regard to portfolio 
assets before the crisis. However, the results are not preserved in the after-the-crisis 
period. Again, it is difficult to claim that patterns by domestic investors show any 
withdrawal of assets overall upon a U.S. monetary policy shock. For portfolio assets, 
a main component of capital flows reacting to U.S. monetary policy, we can observe 
some degree of inflow by residents. Nonetheless, the magnitude compared to the 
before-the-Crisis period are again less than half. We find that the overall 
responsiveness is dwarfed after the crisis.  
Figure 9 shows that the magnitude of withdrawals by foreign investors is also less 
than half that in after-the-crisis sample. While the level of foreign claims does not 
recover to the initial level after six quarters in the before-the-crisis sample, the blue 
line returns to the initial level relatively quickly. These results are mostly driven by 
portfolio flows. We note that the scales of the figure for portfolio flows are twice as 
large as that of the overall figure. While there is more than a 28 percent decrease in 
portfolio flows in the before-the-crisis, sample, those in the after-the-crisis sample 
do not exceed six percent throughout. We also note that the 90 percent error band of 
the impulse response in the after-the-crisis sample does not overlap with the impulse 
response of the before-the-crisis sample.  
We note that the figures overlay the results of the two different samples. Thus, one 
cannot draw any statistical inferences based on our results. Our results are on average 
consistent with the prior hypothesis that the responsiveness of capital flows due to a 
shock is weaker in the after-the-crisis period. As we do assume that each periods 
follows a different data-generating process with different coefficients for all other 
controls, statistical inferences or tests could not be realized from the figures. We also 
add a couple of robustness checks in the appendix, including a specification 
incorporating the VIX or a different time trend. These results are broadly consistent 
with our baseline results. 
Lastly, we compare the results between the current article and the results in Choi 
(2020). In a companion paper, Choi (2020) documents the effects of the U.S. 
monetary policy on gross capital flows, an analysis similar to ours. While asking the 
same question, current article uses the log stock of assets and liabilities, but Choi 
(2020) uses capital flows normalized by quarterly GDP. Also, current one focuses 
on the dynamic (h-periods apart) log changes of assets and liabilities. However, the 
specification in the companion article uses the spontaneous flows (capital flows 
normalized by the quarterly GDP) as the dependent variables. The different types of 
normalization and the different specifications yield somewhat different results. First, 
though Choi (2020) also finds marginally decreased elasticity of capital flows after 
the crisis, the results are mainly driven by other flows, which include banking flows. 
Indeed, with the different normalization process, overall volatilities are greater in 
the other flows and the marginal elasticity of the flows to a U.S. monetary policy 
shock is larger than in the portfolio flows. It is not possible to claim that one  
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Portfolio Assets Other Assets 
 
FIGURE 8. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR  
ASSETS BEFORE AND AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
solid blue line indicates the results from the after-the-crisis period (2010q1--2019q2), and dashed line denotes the 
results from the before-the-crisis period (1995q1—2008q4). Here, the 90 percent confidence intervals are reported. 
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FIGURE 9. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS ON  
LIABILITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
solid blue line indicates the results from the after-the-crisis period (2010q1--2019q2), and dashed line denotes the 
results from the before-the-crisis period (1995q1—2008q4). Here, the 90 percent confidence intervals are reported. 
 
specification outperforms the other. A different normalization method implies a 
different anchor by which to measure the percent or the percentage change of capital 
stock. The current article uses the percent change compared to its own level of stock, 
while the previous article uses the percentage change over the GDP level as the basis 
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for the analysis.  
Thus, our baseline results and consequent claims possibly depend on the 
specification used. Indeed, the lack of robustness in the impulse response analysis of 
a monetary policy shock is well known and widely debated.12 Although we confirm 
our main message in our baseline regression results, we admit that our results may 
vary if we apply another specification, e.g., the number of lags included, other 
controls, etc. Choi (2020) also document an extensive robustness analysis, 
concluding that the results may vary if a different specification is used or if including 
other control variables.  
 
V. Financial Friction and the Elasticity of Capital Flows 
 
Thus far, we have empirically analyzed the impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks 
on capital flows in Korea. In particular, we confirmed that in our baseline regression, 
the marginal responses of capital flows have been far less notable in the sample 
periods after the global financial crisis. In this section, we seek possible explanations 
for the previous empirical results. 
We conjecture that if financial friction, which has been claimed as the main source 
of external vulnerability and the consequent volatile capital flows, can be improved, 
the responsiveness could decrease. Korea has passed through various macroeconomic 
transitions after the global financial crisis. As shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the 
accumulation of assets has outpaced liabilities. Since 2014q3, external assets held 
by residents do exceed claims by international investors. Among others, we focus on 
institutional changes in financial friction. We examine the theoretical model and 
determine whether these improvements of financial friction may be replicated in the 
empirical results in the previous section; if the fraction of net worth that can be 
pledged is increased when the Korean financial sector borrows from outside, it 
should follow that the elasticity of the outflow decreases. 
 
A. A Two-Country New Keynesian Model with Financial Friction 
 
Banerjee, Devereux, and Lombardo (2016) construct a two-country new 
Keynesian model (center (core) and the periphery) with financial friction. They focus 
on the derivation of optimal monetary policies with international cooperative 
stances. However, a basic model was applied in other studies, such as Devereux, 
Engel and Lombardo (2020), who derive implementable monetary policy rules, for 
instance. Here, we do not focus on any changes in monetary policy, nor on whether 
it became cooperative or not after the global financial crisis. Instead, we utilize the 
simplest form of monetary policy, Taylor rules, in their model, and vary the degree 
of financial friction that governs leverage constraints.  
Because we use the same model used as in Banerjee, Devereux, and Lombardo 
(2016) and Devereux, Engel, and Lombard (2020), we abstract from the details of 
the model.13 We also note that as in the original paper, we abstract from quantitative 
 
12See Ramey (2016) for a detailed debate.  
13We provided the equilibrium equations that are used for the simulations in the Appendix. 
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exercises. The model's intuition is as follows. In the model, there are two countries; 
the core and the periphery. Central banks in each country operate their respective 
monetary policies according to the Taylor rule, and there is Calvo-type price rigidity. 
The core households will issue a one-period risk-free bond, and the households of 
the periphery will attempt intertemporal consumption-smoothing through bonds 
issued by the core households. Companies in each country combine labor and capital 
to produce core and peripheral products, respectively. Households in each country 
will consume final goods that combine consumer goods from their own and other 
countries. These are the assumptions of a standard two-country model. 
In addition, we also assume the following types of financial friction. Instead of a 
household owning capital and lending it directly to firms, a bank exists as an 
intermediate.14 Banks have equity capital and can additionally borrow, but only a 
certain fraction of their net worth. Thus, there is a leverage constraint. The core bank 
borrows from the core household considering their net worth, purchase capital goods 
and loan those to the firms in the core country. In addition, the core bank also loans 
a fraction of its funds to banks of the peripheral countries. Periphery banks borrow 
capital from the core banks, along with their own capital. They then purchase capital 
goods and rent those to firms in the periphery. For convenience, we assume that a 
bank in the periphery does not receive any funds from its own households. In this 
structure, the households of the periphery hold bonds from the core households. The 
core households receive funds by issuing assets to periphery households and then 
rent those to the core banks, who will finance the banks in the periphery and firms 
in the periphery eventually. With this system, we can determine the gross capital 
flows between the two countries.  
The model with financial friction in the banking sector has the following 
discrepancies compared to the standard model. If there is a monetary policy shock 
in the core economy, the leverage constraints in the bank will be tightened and the 
spread between the interest rate for funds borrowed by the company and the interest 
rate of the risk-free bond will increase. As a result, capital is not sufficiently brokered 
and is not sufficiently transferred to production. In addition, as the amount of funded 
capital decreases, core investors reduce their amounts of capital invested in 
peripheral countries. In other words, foreign claims will decrease with monetary 
policy shock. The impact of this increase in core interest rates leads to a decrease in 
the income of the peripheral households due to the general equilibrium effect. The 
peripheral households sell foreign assets, and the periphery residents’ capital 
invested abroad then decreases. 
Regarding the impact of a US rate hike, the model creates inefficiency in financial 
intermediation, and such factors are greatly amplified by the impact of capital 
inflows. From a resident’s point of view, leverage constraints and an increase in 
spreads are the most important causes of volatility in capital outflows. In the model, 
the parameters of these leverage constraints are denoted by 
t
 . In the original paper, 
the stochastic processes 
t
  of the two countries are identical. On the other hand, in 
this paper, we assume that each country has processes with different mean value 
 
14We note that banks in the model do not necessarily stand for banking flows. Rather they represents any kind 
of financial intermediaries that intermediate capital between agents.  
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parameters. Thus, our presumptions during these thought experiments are as follows: 
during the period before the global financial crisis, Korea, i.e., the periphery, has a 
smaller value than a developed country. However, after the global financial crisis, 
there is an improvement in the credibility of Korean borrowers, and fractions of net 
worth that can be pledged are enhanced. 
e
t
  increases and the degree to which 
leverage is restricted is lowered.  
At this point, we examine the responses of periphery household’s assets and core 
household’s assets (liabilities of the periphery) upon a core rate hike. The leverage 
constraints of core banks have a value of 0.45 both before and after the global 
financial crisis. Core banks can borrow 45% of their equity value from households. 
However, the leverage constraint of peripheral banks has a value of 0.38 before the 
global financial crisis and is then enhanced to 0.45 thereafter. Periphery banks can 
borrow 38% of the value of capital from core banks beforehand. These restrictions 
will be increased to 45% after the global financial crisis due to the institutional 
improvement. If the inefficiency of financial intermediation is reduced, the impact 
of the interest rate hike on the core will also be lower.  
With an enhanced value of 
t
  , the core monetary policy hike will not be 
transmitted to periphery economies as much as before. As a result, loans from core 
banks to peripherals decrease by less. The income decrease by periphery households 
due to the interruption in financial intermediation would also be less severe. The 
assets that the peripheral households withdraw from the core households will be 
smaller as a result. 
The results of these simulations are reported in Figure 10. The Y axis represents 
the deviations from the steady-state values. We find that the impact of a rate hike in 
the core country (U.S.) reduces foreign assets in both countries. However, there are 
discrepancies between different values of 
e
t
  s. The solid blue line shows the 
impulse responses with an increase in 
e
t
 , while the dashed line shows the impulse 
responses with the previous value of 
e
t
  . Again, a larger 
e
t
  indicates an 
improvement in institutional friction and thus applies to after-the-crisis periods. We  
 
 
FIGURE 10. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A MONETARY POLICY SHOCK IN A CENTER COUNTRY PERIPHERY 
Note: The figure shows the external positions of the periphery and the center economies relative to each other. Total 
assets of the center will be a liability to Korea. The blue line denotes the impulse response of a center monetary 
policy shock with increased leverage constraints. 
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also find that for the blue solid line, there is less deviation from the steady state due 
to the impact as compared to that indicated by the black dashed line. That is, there is 
less responsiveness in the reallocation of assets than beforehand. With the 
improvement in foreign investor’s credibility and the improved pledgeability for the 
given value of net worth, spillover from the U.S. monetary policy becomes weaker. 
 
B. Other Possible Answers,  
International Trilemma and Independence of Monetary Policy 
 
To this point, we find that institutional changes in financial intermediations may 
explain the lower level of responsiveness of capital flows to a U.S. monetary policy 
shock. However, there could also be many other culprits.  
Along with various macroeconomic transitions, it is possible that in different 
circumstances, policies which govern the responsiveness of capital flows to U.S. 
monetary policy shocks have changed. Currently, there are many studies 
documenting optimal monetary policy responses to foreign capital inflows. An 
optimal monetary policy which simultaneously determines the optimal exchange rate 
policy depends on domestic fundamentals, such as dominant currency pricing and 
financial friction.15 With the altered external circumstances, monetary policy may 
have changed as well. At the same time, macro-prudential policies or capital controls 
have been adopted since the global financial crisis, and those may have been 
effective since that time.  
Indeed, Korea may not be the only country that has undergone a transition with 
regard to international capital flows. Shin (2014) claims that while the first phase of 
global liquidity was marked by banking flows, the second phase of global liquidity 
after the global financial crisis is now marked by bond flows, especially debt 
securities. Possibly, it is more of what is termed push-side transitions than their push-
side counterparts. Avdjiev et al. (2020) noted that the overall marginal response of 
capital flows based on U.S. monetary policy rose substantially due to the 2013 Fed’s 
‘taper tantrum’, and then reverted. They claim that the change in the responsiveness 
was mainly driven by increases in the lending shares of more capitalized banking 
systems. Forbes and Warnock (2020) claim that extreme capital flow movements 
themselves have not increased since the global financial crisis. At the same time, 
extreme capital flow movements are less correlated with changes in global risks.  
Even if we are not sure of the true cause of the change in vulnerability of capital 
flows, we can discuss possible influences on monetary policy, especially the 
independence of monetary policy. One of the most cited propositions in international 
economics is the international impossible trinity. The trilemma argues that the 
opening of the capital market, the independence of monetary policy, and a fixed 
exchange rate cannot be achieved simultaneously. A small open economy which 
operates a fixed exchange rate system and has a high degree of openness in the 
capital market has significant limitations in terms of monetary policy operations. 
Market participants are empirically testifying that Korea's capital outflows are 
strong against external shocks. Reflecting this situation, the IMF's Article IV report 
evaluated Korea's financial assets as safe assets according to such a situation. If this 
 
15See Akinci and Queralto (2019) and the references therein.  
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change in the trend is true, it will be possible to secure considerable independence 
of monetary policy operations. It is possible to focus more on internal problems 
during the operation of monetary policy. Further discussions and research are needed 




In this article, we document the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks on gross 
capital flows in Korea. External shocks are typically the main sources of 
vulnerability in an open economy. Especially in Korea, several waves of capital 
inflows and subsequent sudden withdrawals have caused severe fluctuations. To 
understand the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks, which are claimed to have 
caused the global financial crisis, not only foreign capital flows but also residents’ 
capital flows should be the lynchpin of monetary and fiscal policies.  
We show that first in Korea, as in other small open economies, not only net but 
also gross capital flows matter. When U.S. monetary policy shocks increase, foreign 
and domestic investors withdraw their positions in Korea and in other parts of the 
world, respectively. Consistent with people’s prior behavior, the elasticity of capital 
flows have changed since the global financial crisis. We explore the possibility of an 
institutional improvement on financial friction. If the amount to pledge against 
foreign investors has increased, the responses of both types of investors would 
decrease upon a monetary policy shock of the core economy, i.e., the U.S.  
We claim that our findings could serve as guidance for monetary or exchange rate 
policymakers. However, we also claim that our reasoning is only suggestive at this 
moment. Further evidence is needed. Especially for institutional change, micro-level 
data (loan level and covenant) are needed, though this remains as a future research 
agenda. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Robustness Checks 
 
1. Empirical Results: All Periods 
 
In this section, we present the impulse responses of U.S. monetary policies in the 
form of gross capital flows for all sample periods. In our baseline specification, we 
split our sample into two bins, before and after the crisis, and analyze each bin 
independently. The results therein are similar to those analyzed for panel data, for 
example in Banerjee, Devereux, and Lombardo (2016). 
One may instead be interested in running the entire sample while including the 
global financial crisis period. Consequently, in the appendix, we report the results 
for this specification. We include a crisis dummy for both the global financial crisis 
and the East Asian Crisis; the crisis dummy is one for 2008q1-2009q2 and 1997q4-
1998q1. Our results are reported in Figure A1 and Figure A2. Unlike the baseline 
results in section 4, we do not see capital inflows by residents (decrease in assets), 
nor capital outflows of foreign investors (decrease of liabilities). In Figure A1, 
capital flows by residents show consistent increases with U.S. monetary policy 
shocks. This pattern does not vary with different types of flows. Also in Figure A2, 
we see consistent increases of foreign flows with U.S. monetary policy shocks. The 
results do not vary even if we include squared time trends as a further control. 
Overall, we could not recover the patterns observed in other studies.  
We conjecture that there is a break in the time trend before and after the crisis. 
Thus, it is possible that outflows by foreign investors and inflows by residents, which 
are widely reported in other emerging economies, are only observed if we split the 
sample and apply different time trend for both economies. 
 
Total Assets FDI Assets 
 
Portfolio Assets Other Assets 
 
FIGURE A1. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR ASSETS, ALL PERIODS 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. 
Light grey shows the 90 percent confidence intervals, while dark grey shows the 68 percent confidence intervals. 
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FIGURE A2. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR LIABILITIES, ALL PERIODS 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks in the logged liabilities, i.e., claims 
of foreign investors. Light grey shows the 90 percent confidence intervals, while dark grey shows the 68 percent 
confidence intervals. 
  
2. Empirical Results: with VIX 
 
In this chapter, we report the results of a specification with the VIX and drop the 
appreciation of nominal exchange rates. We exclude the VIX as a control in our 
baseline analysis, as the global risk aversion captured by the VIX can fluctuate due 
to U.S. monetary policies. Thus, to include the VIX as an extra control while 
incorporating the shock itself may lead to endogeneity issues. At the same time, it is 
also possible that there are orthogonal deviations of the VIX with U.S. monetary 
policies. Thus, we utilize a specification which includes the VIX as a control. Also, 
we exclude nominal exchange rate appreciation as a control. As a small open 
economy, the baseline specification presumes that exchange rates vary along with 
external sources and thus form an exogenous variable. However, it is also plausible 
that nominal exchange rates are determined endogenously. In a new specification, 
we exclude nominal exchange rate appreciation and include the VIX as a control. 
Figure A3 and Figure A4 shows the results. 
Overall, our main message is not altered. For capital flows by domestic residents, 
the declines in the total flows are lower in the after-the-crisis bins. However, the 
discrepancies are not very notable. On the other hand, portfolio flows show clearer 
distinctions between the two. While there is a clear hump shape in the before-the-
crisis sample, no clear pattern is observed in the after-the-crisis sample. For the 
foreign capital flows shown in Figure A4, the results are less stark between the 
samples before and after the crisis. However, the overall images are very similar; the 
average responses of foreign outflows are weaker than before, and the results are 
mainly driven by portfolio flows. 
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Total Assets FDI Assets 
 
Portfolio Assets Other Assets 
 
FIGURE A3. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR  
ASSETS BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISIS, WITH THE VIX 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
solid blue line indicates the results from the after-the-crisis period (2010q1--2019q2), and the dashed line represents the 
results from the before-the-crisis period (1995q1—2008q4). Here, 90 percent confidence intervals are reported. 
 
Total Liabilities FDI Liabilities 
 
Portfolio Liabilities Other Liabilities 
 
FIGURE A4. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR  
LIABILITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISIS, WITH THE VIX 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
solid blue line indicates for the results from the after-the-crisis period (2010q1--2019q2), and the dashed line represents 
the results from the before-the-crisis period (1995q1—2008q4). Here, 90 percent confidence intervals are reported. 
  
3. Empirical Results: Other Time Trends 
 
One can expect that the upward or downward pattern can be controlled by with 
the added t-squared trend. That is, if further controlling a hump-shaped pattern, one  
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FIGURE A5. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR  
ASSETS BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISIS, WITH THE T-SQUARED TREND 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
solid blue line indicates the results from the after-the-crisis period (2010q1--2019q2), and the dashed line represents the 
results from the before-the-crisis period (1995q1—2008q4). Here, the 90 percent confidence intervals are reported. 
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FIGURE A6. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR  
LIABILITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISIS, WITH THE T-SQUARED TREND 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
solid blue line indicates the results from the after-the-crisis period (2010q1--2019q2), and the dashed line represents the 
results from the before-the-crisis period (1995q1—2008q4). Here, 90 percent confidence intervals are reported. 
 
may find different implications of the impulse response patterns.  
Here, we report the outcomes with the t-squared term included. Again, our overall 
message does not change. Foreign capital outflows are mostly notable with a U.S. 
monetary policy shock, and this response is mostly driven by portfolio flows. While 
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there is less of an upward or downward trend in the FDI or other flows, the results 
do not alter our overall picture. 
 
4. Empirical Results: Interacting with the Crisis Dummy 
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FIGURE A7. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR  
ASSETS BEFORE THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, INTERACTING CRISIS DUMMY 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
sample ranges from 1995q1 to 2008q4. Light grey indicates the 90 percent confidence intervals, while dark grey 
denotes the 68 percent confidence intervals. 
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Portfolio Liabilities Other Liabilities 
 
FIGURE A8. IMPULSE RESPONSES TO U.S. MONETARY SHOCKS FOR  
LIABILITIES AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, INTERACTING CRISIS DUMMY 
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the logged assets of residents. The 
sample ranges from 1995q1 to 2008q4. Light grey indicates the 90 percent confidence intervals, while dark grey 
denotes the 68 percent confidence intervals. 
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It is also possible for capital flows to have different responses to a monetary policy 
shock. Thus, in this chapter we incorporate a crisis dummy with a monetary policy 
shock for the sample period before the global financial crisis. Here, we utilize two 
periods: the East Asian Crisis (1997q4-1998q1) and the financial turmoil due to the 
IT bubble (2003q1-2003q2). Additionally, the new specification only changes the 
results for before-the-crisis sample, and the results will be identical for the after-the-
crisis sample period. Figures A7-A8 correspond to Figures 4 and 5 in our main body. 
Unfortunately, the results do not vary much from our baseline regression. There is 
no significant chance in the impulse responses of the monetary policy (during the 
non-crisis state), and the confidence intervals are still very wide and robust. Thus, to 
mute the large swings during the crisis state, it appears to be sufficient to put a wedge 
in the capital flows during periods of turmoil. 
 
B. Full Set of Equations for the Model Simulations 
 
We supplement the full set of equations to simulate Banerjee, Devereux, and 
Lombardo (2016). It should be noted that we simply assume the Taylor rule as a 
monetary policy both for core and center economies. Thus, the current set of 
equations consists of equations from the simplest model presented in Banerjee, 
Devereux, and Lombardo (2016). Please see Banerjee, Devereux, and Lombardo 
(2015) for a more in-depth description of the system of equations. 
 
1. Households’ Problem 
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4. Monetary Policy 
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5. Center Country’s Optimization Problem 
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6. Center Country Banks’ Problem 
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